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> Upshot • The authors offer a theory of agency that is general enough to apply to whole organisms and single cells, 
and meaningful enough to highlight problems that embodied cognition theory has overlooked. The authors insist that 
the interesting thing about minds is what goes on in between activities; this leaves unclear what a specifically enactiv-
ist empirical program could look like. But the book can be read as a contribution to a broader project of instituting a 
full-blown post-cognitivist science of the mind.
The traditional methodology employed in the psychology laboratory sees re-
search volunteers being asked to carry out 
some task under carefully defined task con-
ditions. The idea is to understand how that 
task works, in the hope that the explanation 
can later be applied to understanding simi-
lar tasks.
In their book, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Thom-
as Buhrmann, and Xabier Barandiaran 
suggest that this way of doing things over-
looks the most fundamental phenomena of 
mental life. They are more interested in this 
question: How is it that, in the course of our 
lived experience, we find ourselves switch-
ing from engaging in some activity to engag-
ing in some other activity? “Enactivism,” we 
are told,
“ is concerned with explaining precisely these 
critical transitions between particular conditions 
that sometimes afford different functional de-
scriptions and those ‘in-between’ dynamics that 
(re)constitute these or novel conditions.” (27)
So instead of trying to understand tasks we 
are trying to understand what goes on in be-
tween tasks. How might we go about study-
ing such a thing?
Di Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran’s 
approach to answering this question is al-
most entirely theoretical. At the heart of 
the book is a three-chapter presentation of 
the authors’ theory of agency. These three 
chapters can be summarized in the follow-
ing claim. To be an agent is to exhibit three 
constitutive components of agency:
  self-individuation,
  interactional asymmetry, and
  normativity.
To grasp the central proposal of the book, it 
is therefore important to understand each of 
these three technical terms.
The first item, self-individuation, is es-
sentially the same as old-fashioned autopoi-
esis, or self-production (Maturana & Varela 
1980). A self-individuating system is one 
that establishes a boundary between itself 
and its environment, and maintains itself 
in the face of precarious conditions, e.g., by 
continually consuming resources from the 
environment. The second item, interactional 
asymmetry, points to the fact that organisms 
do things. Agents are not mere reactive au-
tomata, as some versions of stimulus–re-
sponse psychology once suggested. Agents 
act on their environment. They actively ex-
plore and perform, they do not wait passive-
ly for stimulation to come along. The term 
“asymmetry” here is intended to denote 
that causation comes from the animal side 
of the animal–environment relation: a liv-
ing agent causes its own activities. The third 
item, normativity, is intended to account for 
the fact that an agent can succeed or fail in 
its dealings with the world. The most basic 
form of normativity is evolutionary adaptiv-
ity. A single cell is succeeding, in adaptive 
terms, in the case that it continues to avoid 
situations that might threaten its existence. 
The authors later allow other forms of nor-
mativity, e.g., certain behaviors in humans 
are driven by aesthetic considerations about 
the “correct way” to perform some activity.
This tripartite definition of agency al-
lows the authors to categorize various phe-
nomena as either agency-involving or not. 
Assembly-line robots fulfill two of the cri-
teria: they exhibit normativity and asymme-
try. They are set up to perform a task upon 
raw materials, and they can fail at this task. 
But they do not exhibit self-individuation. 
They do not fix themselves when they go 
wrong, or give birth to new assembly line 
robots. They are not agents. By contrast, an 
E. Coli bacterium swimming up a sugar gra-
dient is an agent. It fulfills all three criteria: 
in swimming towards the food source, it is 
contributing to its own self-maintenance as 
a metabolic unit (individuation), it is acting 
on its environment (asymmetry), and it is 
behaving in a way that is adaptive to its own 
continued existence (normativity).
A common criticism of the enactivist 
approach is that its analysis only properly 
applies at the level of the cell, and that this 
is an inappropriate starting point for at-
tempting to explain cognition in general. Di 
Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran are eager 
to respond to this. Their innovation is to 
provide an account of how their theory of 
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agency can be applied at the whole-animal 
level. The key move here is to describe the 
animal as constituting a network of sen-
sorimotor schemes. The animal, they ar-
gue, comes to be organized as a system of 
schemes. This happens as a consequence of 
the behaviors that it repeatedly engages in. 
These schemes are not motor programs, or 
output algorithms, in the cognitivist sense, 
but are “world-involving.” A hawk can enact 
its hunting-related schemes only when the 
appropriate environmental conditions ob-
tain: in an open sky with good visibility, not 
in a confined space or in thick fog.
The authors suggest that this network of 
schemes is itself a system that exhibits the 
three characteristic properties of agency, as 
earlier applied to the cell. In order for the 
hawk to remain a viable system, it must 
continually enact and maintain its various 
behavioral schemes (the network exhibits 
self-individuation), it must do this by act-
ing on its environment in appropriate ways 
(the network asymmetrically causes action 
in the world), and it must avoid situations 
that threaten the continued viability of the 
network, or the animal (the network exhib-
its adaptivity or normativity). If the animal 
enters a situation where it is no longer able 
to maintain its sensorimotor network, as 
when the hawk becomes injured or enters 
captivity, then it has entered a state of decay 
that may ultimately issue in death. The prop-
erties of agency that were present at the level 
of the cell thus re-emerge at the level of the 
whole organism.
An attractive property of Di Paolo, 
Buhrmann & Barandiaran’s account is that 
it incorporates a theory of learning. The au-
thors advocate a dialectical understanding 
of the emergence of new skills. Borrowing 
from Jean Piaget, they conceive of the ani-
mal as an active explorer of its environment. 
As the animal explores, it encounters new 
structures that present difficulties, and it 
must respond to these by assimilating the 
new structures into its sensorimotor net-
work, i.e., it must learn to deal with new sit-
uations. In this sense, the authors’ account is 
a constructivist one.
Where the authors depart from classi-
cal, anti-realist constructivism is in their 
attempt to accommodate some of the in-
sights of the explicitly realist program of 
ecological psychology, instigated by James 
Gibson (1966, 1979). A central claim Gib-
son makes is that the environment of a spe-
cies already has meaningful structure even 
before a particular animal encounters it. 
The authors are somewhat cautious about 
embracing this:
“ We agree with ecological psychologists when 
they highlight that real environments are rich 
enough to access directly their relevant mean-
ingful aspects. We think they are in fact too rich, 
in that sense-making always involves a massive 
reduction of all the environmental energies that 
might affect the agent, to those within the dimen-
sions of biological, sensorimotor, and social his-
torically contingent meaning.” (227)
Di Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran lean 
heavily on the work of Gibson’s followers in 
dynamic systems approaches (e.g., Van or-
den et al. 2003), but, puzzlingly, they are dis-
missive of Gibson’s own work. Their beef is 
that Gibson’s approach leaves the animal as 
a passive reactor to environmental features. 
Echoing Varela, Thompson, & rosch (1991), 
they suggest that Gibson’s view leaves too lit-
tle for the animal to do, and gives the envi-
ronment too great a role in driving behavior 
(18). on page 74 they write:
“ in the ecological approach, the origin of the 
particular motor patterns that bring about the 
invariant-revealing transformations is not always 
considered relevant; instead, what matters in 
many cases is simply the structure of movement-
induced flows.”
But this is a misreading of Gibson’s 
project. Gibson never claimed that the en-
vironment alone could cause the animal to 
perceive or act in a certain way. Like the 
enactivists, he understood natural vision 
as something the animal does: “we look 
around, walk up to something interesting 
and move around it so as to see it from all 
sides” (Gibson 1979: 1). Gibson’s method-
ological move was to start with an account 
of the kind of structure that exists in the 
environment. To understand the animal’s 
behavior, the thinking goes, we must first 
understand what the animal’s behavior is 
directed towards. Di Paolo, Buhrmann & 
Barandiaran acknowledge the importance 
of this environmental structure, but over-
look the empirical implications.
Having an account of structure in the 
environment is important because it pro-
vides a basis for understanding how an 
animal performs a particular task. An un-
derstanding of optic flow patterns produced 
during locomotion allows us to identify dy-
namic properties that are implicated in the 
control of, say, braking behavior (Warren 
2006). An instance of braking to avoid a col-
lision is characterized by a recognizable start 
and end point and a pattern of transition be-
tween the two. First, the driver detects an 
obstacle in the road ahead, then the driver 
must control the slowing of the vehicle rela-
tive to the perceptual looming of the obsta-
cle, finally the vehicle is brought to a stop, 
preferably before it hits the obstacle. Cru-
cially, for Gibsonians, the optic looming pat-
tern occurs as a lawful consequence of the 
way the obstacle reflects light to the mov-
ing position of observation occupied by the 
driver’s eyes. The control structure is a prop-
erty of the animal–environment system. The 
tools of dynamic systems thinking are most 
effective when deployed in understanding 
this type of well-defined task. A task here re-
fers to a convenient, tractable unit of study: 
a start–transition–end. Talking about tasks 
is what allows us to understand the structure 
of a particular behavior without inappropri-
ately decomposing the animal–environment 
system into component units.
This brings us back to where we started. 
Di Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran are sus-
picious of attempts to divide the problem 
space of cognitive science into functional 
units, or tasks. What we want to explain, 
they assert, is the dynamics of what comes 
“in between.” But having thus rejected seem-
ingly all forms of reductionism, they are left 
with an impossible project. They devote 
much of the first half of the book to provid-
ing a dynamic systems gloss on various as-
pects of their theory – their concept of the 
sensorimotor network, and their Piagetian 
account of learning. But without a method 
for breaking down the system and studying 
it piece by piece, it is not clear how their ap-
proach can ever lend itself to a productive 
program of empirical research.
Then again, perhaps a specifically en-
activist program of empirical research is 
not needed at this point. The book should 
be read in the context of ongoing attempts 
to unite various non-representational ap-
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proaches into a single full-blown post-
cognitivist science of the mind, which the 
authors mention approvingly (18; see, e.g., 
Chemero 2009; McGann 2014). Where Di 
Paolo, Buhrmann & Barandiaran succeed 
is in highlighting what has been missing 
from post-cognitivist approaches to date. 
Their account of sensorimotor agency is to 
be applauded in that it provides a way to 
understand how an organism’s individual 
history gets into the system and is able to 
causally influence its subsequent behavior. 
This is something that has been neglected 
in dynamical systems approaches outside of 
the developmental field (for a treatment of 
development in dynamical terms, see Thelen 
& Smith 1994). Sensorimotor Life is proba-
bly the most important book in enactivism 
since Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life (2007). 
More than that, though, it is a contribution 
to a broader conversation on what a future 
cognitive science can and should look like. 
A tension remains between the anti-realism 
of their constructivist project and the real-
ism of the ecological/dynamical account 
they seek to accommodate. Perhaps a dia-
lectical resolution of this tension is possible. 
If such a resolution could be found, cogni-
tivism would be faced with a formidable 
competitor.
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